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401 
The First Amendment Has Entered the Chat: 
Oklahoma’s Cyberharassment Law 
I. Introduction 
If he wants to be a female, make him a female. 




In August 2018, a Facebook post sent the small town of Achille, 
Oklahoma, into chaos.
2
 As classes resumed in the small, rural town, a local 
mother took to Facebook, warning other parents that the school was 
allowing a twelve-year-old transgender girl named Maddie to use the girls’ 
restroom.
3
 The comments section of the post soon became riddled with 
demeaning language, calling the young girl derogatory names like “the 
transgender.”
4
 Soon thereafter the language turned threatening, and the 
digital crowd began to suggest that the young girl’s genitalia should be 
mutilated, and that other youth should “whip” her until she stops coming 
back to school.
5
 The vicious comments made the young girl “afraid to sleep 




The story of Maddie’s torment is the unfortunate product of a digital 
revolution. The world is rapidly advancing in digital technology, presenting 
users with new platforms for speech and markets for communication.
7
 
Lawmakers are racing to curtail the undesirable speech of an increasingly 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Brooke Sopelsa, Oklahoma Schools Close After Adults Threaten Transgender 
Student, NBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2018, 8:44 AM CDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/ 
nbc-out/oklahoma-schools-close-after-adults-threaten-transgender-student-n900881 (quoting 
Facebook comment). 
 2. See id.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Christina Caron, Transgender Girl, 12, Is Violently Threatened After Facebook Post 
by Classmate’s Parent, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/ 
us/transgender-oklahoma-school-bullying.html.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id.; Eli Rosenberg, Transgender Girl and Family Plan to Leave Oklahoma After She 
Was Threatened for Using Girls’ Restroom, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2018, 8:53 PM CDT), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2018/08/21/transgender-girl-family-plan-leave-
oklahoma-after-she-was-threatened-using-girls-restroom/. 
 7. See Richard M. Martinez, The Legal Landscape of Cyberharassment, Cyberstalking, 
and Cyber Bullying, in BRIAN D. DERSHAW ET AL., THE IMPACT OF RECENT CYBERSTALKING 
AND CYBERHARASSMENT CASES (2014), 2014 WL 1600590. 
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 As modern interaction gravitates towards the internet, the 
laws surrounding digital communication are slow to catch up.
9
 In many 
ways, the online community is a metaphorical wild west, forcing lawmakers 
to handle behavior seldom tolerated in person. Laws that once criminalized 




In a recent study, sixty-two percent of Americans said that online 
harassment was a “major problem.”
11
 The same study found that “[a]round 
four-in-ten Americans” have fallen victim to some form of online 
harassment.
12
 Despite a general consensus about the problematic nature of 
cyberharassment, “[Americans] are highly divided on how to balance 
concerns over safety with the desire to encourage free and open speech.”
13
 
In November 2019, Oklahoma enacted statutory protections against 
threatening online behavior with amendments to title 21, section 1172 of 
the Oklahoma Statutes. In doing so, Oklahoma joins many other states that 
have attempted to protect their citizens from threatening online 
communication.
14
 However, these statutes, which are largely analogous to 
Oklahoma’s law, raise alarming First Amendment issues. As Oklahoma 
grapples with cyberharassment restrictions in their infancy, citizens must 
consider if this law survives the exacting standards of the First Amendment.  
This Note will analyze Oklahoma’s threatening communications or 
“cyberharassment” statute in two contexts. First, this Note will discuss the 
relevant statutes and cases which precede Oklahoma’s updated law. 
Cyberharassment laws are ubiquitous in the United States and have enjoyed 
varying degrees of success in challenges to their constitutionality. Thus, a 
comparison of those laws and the cases stemming from their enactment is 
necessary. Second, this Note will evaluate the statutory language and 
mechanics of Oklahoma’s law from a constitutional perspective. Much of 
the debate surrounding these cyberharassment laws implicates the First 
Amendment, as lawmakers attempt to tiptoe around unconstitutionally 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See generally id.  
 9. Id. at *1.  
 10. See id. at *3–9.  
 11. Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment 2017, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2017), 
https://www.pewinternet.org/2017/07/11/online-harassment-2017/. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.  
 14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6206 (West 2018); 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805 (West 2018); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1310 (West 
2019); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-14a (West 2018).  
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limiting online speech. This Note argues that Oklahoma’s law has both 
permissible and unconstitutionally overbroad language. Therefore, cases 
like that of twelve-year-old Maddie still need statutory authority that is both 
structurally clear and constitutional. This Note will conclude with a 
roadmap for Oklahoma’s legislators to accomplish this goal. 
II. State and Federal Cyberharassment Laws 
A. First Amendment Jurisprudence: 10,000 Foot View 
A brief overview of First Amendment jurisprudence is helpful to lay the 
foundation for the analysis of state and federal law. The First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”
15
 The First Amendment and its 
protections apply to Oklahoma laws through the Fourteenth Amendment.
16
 
At the core of the First Amendment’s promises lies the understanding that 
the “government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
17
 However, the First 
Amendment is not without bounds; “[t]here is a point where First 
Amendment protections end and government regulation of speech or 
expressive conduct becomes permissible.”
18
 The Supreme Court has 
historically observed the following speech to be outside of the First 
Amendment’s protections: “speech or expressive conduct designed to incite 
imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal 
conduct, so-called ‘fighting words,’ child pornography, fraud, true threats, 
and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has 
the power to prevent.”
19
 Although the media of speech and communication 
have rapidly advanced in recent years, First Amendment principles remain 
the same for communication online and through computer technology.
20
 
                                                                                                                 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 16. See State v. Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d 531, 538 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that 
the First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 17. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983)). 
 18. In re Welfare of A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Minn. 2019).  
 19. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 
709, 717 (2012)).  
 20. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“[W]hatever the 
challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principles 
of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary’ 
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Finally, many states have passed “cyberbullying” laws for communication 
directed at minors.
21
 However, this Note will focus instead on general 
cyberharassment laws which apply to all persons.
22
 
B. It Takes Two (Statutes) to Tango: West Virginia and Minnesota 
West Virginia is among the many states that specifically name 
“electronic” or “telecommunication” in their harassment statutes.
23
 In 
February 2002, West Virginia passed a statute that criminalizes “[o]bscene, 
anonymous, harassing and threatening communications by computer.”
24
 
Under this statute, it is “unlawful for any person, with the intent to harass or 
abuse another person, to use a computer, mobile phone, personal digital 
assistant” or any other device for electronic communication to:  
(1) Make contact with another person without disclosing his or 
her identity with the intent to harass or abuse; (2) Make contact 
with a person after being requested by the person to desist from 
contacting them . . . ; (3) Threaten to commit a crime against any 
person or property; or (4) Cause obscene material to be delivered 
or transmitted to a specific person after being requested to desist 
from sending such material.
25
 
In 2013, Matthew Calvert was arrested by law enforcement in West 
Virginia and subsequently indicted by a grand jury for “the misdemeanor 
offense of making harassing and threatening communications by 
computer.”
26
 On a website called “Topix,” Calvert threatened the family of 
Clarksburg, West Virginia’s former chief of police, saying “I will have no 
problem answering your husband, your son, your friend, and any 
                                                                                                                 
when a new and different medium for communication appears.” (quoting Joseph Burstyn, 
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952))).  
 21. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 821 (N.C. 2016) (determining that the 
cyberbullying law “swe[pt] far beyond the State's legitimate interest in protecting the 
psychological health of minors” and failed a strict scrutiny analysis).  
 22. Cyberharassment and cyberstalking are sometimes used interchangeably. However, 
cyberharassment is defined as “the use of electronic communication, such as the Internet or 
e-mail to stalk, which generally includes a pattern of threatening or menacing behaviors.” 
Martinez, supra note 7, at *2. 
 23. See Brief for NACDL as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–5, Ogle v. 
Texas, 140 S. Ct. 118 (2019) (No. 18-1182), 2019 WL 2267215, at *4–5.  
 24. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-14a (West 2018).  
 25. Id. § 61–3C–14a (a)(1)–(4). 
 26. State v. Calvert, No. 15-0195, 2016 WL 3179968, at *2 (W. Va. June 3, 2016).  
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Clarksburg police department officer with my Mossberg shotgun” and “you 
come to my house bitch, I will open your chest with my 12 gauge.”
27
 Local 
detectives soon began monitoring the comment thread and questioned 
Calvert before eventually arresting him.
28
 Calvert was convicted and 
subsequently appealed the lower court’s sentencing order, arguing that the 
statute violates the First Amendment.
29
 
On appeal, Calvert’s First Amendment argument did not persuade the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The court noted that “the right 
of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances” and 
“[t]hreats of violence do not fall within the parameters of constitutionally 
protected speech.”
30
 The opinion pointed to Supreme Court precedent that 
acknowledged the government's interest in “protecting individuals from the 
fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the 
possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”
31
 The court then 
compared the West Virginia cyberharassment statute to the “nearly 




 which is 




The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia also noted that 
“[p]rohibiting harassment is not prohibiting speech, because harassment is 
not a protected speech.”
35
 Although harassment can manifest through 
speech, it is not communication. Therefore, because this statute is purely 
targeting actions taken to harass, it is directed at conduct—not protected 
speech.
36
 Because this telecommunications statute targets conduct and not 
the content of the communication, “[i]t seeks to protect citizens from 
harassment in an even-handed and neutral fashion,” avoiding any concerns 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. at *1. 
 28. Id. at *2.  
 29. See id. at *4–5.  
 30. Id. at *4 (first quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942); 
and then quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).  
 31. Id. (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388).  
 32. Id. at *5. 
 33. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61–8–16(a)(4) (West 2020). 
 34. Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that West 
Virginia’s telecommunications statute “is narrowly drawn to effect the legitimate interest of 
government in protecting its citizens from harassing conduct”). 
 35. Id. at 243 (quoting State v. Thorne, 333 S.E.2d 817, 819 (W. Va. 1985)). 
 36. Id.  
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about free speech or overbreadth.
37
 Thus, West Virginia’s harassment 
statute remains in effect.  
Like West Virginia’s cyberharassment and telecommunications statutes, 
Minnesota utilizes multiple statutes to address cyberharassment. However, 
Minnesota’s statutory scheme relies on both harassment and stalking laws.
38
 
Minnesota Statute section 609.795 is known as the “mail-harassment 
statute.”
39
 This statute originated as a mail privacy law in 1963, but the state 
legislature amended the statute in 2000 to include communications sent 
“electronic[ally].”
40
 Subdivision 1(3) makes it a misdemeanor to 
“repeatedly mail[] or deliver[] or cause[] the delivery by any means, 
including electronically, of letters, telegrams, or packages” with the specific 
intent to “abuse, disturb, or cause distress.”
41
  
Minnesota’s second important statute is known as the “stalking-by-mail 
provision.”
42
 The stalking statute went into effect in 1993 and was updated 
in 2000 to include electronic communications.
43
 The stalking-by-mail 
provision makes it a misdemeanor to harass another by “repeatedly 
mail[ing] or deliver[ing] or caus[ing] the delivery by any means, including 
electronically, of letters, telegrams, messages, packages . . . or any 
communication made through any available technologies or other 
objects.”
44
 Unlike the mail-harassment statute, the stalking statute did not 
include a specific intent clause.
45
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court focused on this “intent” distinction in In 
re Welfare of A. J. B.
46
 In March 2016, A.J.B. created an anonymous 
Twitter account to target a fellow high school student, M.B.
47
 In a period of 
two to three hours, A.J.B. posted forty tweets with “cruel and egregious 
insults” either relating to or directly mentioning M.B. on Twitter.
48
 Some of 
the tweets preyed on M.B.’s autism, while others used homophobic 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See id. at 244.  
 38. See In re Welfare of A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 2019).  
 39. Id.; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.795 (West 2020). 
 40. Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch. 311, 2000 Minn. Laws 185, 185.  
 41. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.795 (West 2020).  
 42. A. J. B., 929 N.W. 2d at 844; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749(2)(6) (West 2018), 
invalidated by A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840.  
 43. 2000 Minn. Laws at 185.  
 44. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749 (West 2018), invalidated by A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840.  
 45. Id.  
 46. See A. J. B., 929 N.W. 2d at 844. 
 47. Id. at 844–45. 
 48. Id.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/7





 A collection of the tweets also urged M.B. to kill himself by 
either drinking bleach or wearing “a cologne called ‘[a]nthrax.’”
50
 Upon 
seeing the forty abusive tweets, M.B. contemplated suicide.
51
 Minnesota 
charged A.J.B. with “one count of gross-misdemeanor stalking by use of 
the mail . . . and one count of misdemeanor harassment by use of the 
mail . . . .”
52
 Additionally, the state attached a charge for felony stalking due 
to the “offender’s bias toward the victim’s disability.”
53
 A.J.B. argued that 
“the statutes were facially unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the 
First Amendment and as applied to him”; this argument, however, was 
rejected by the trial and appellate courts.
54
  
The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that (1) the stalking-by-mail 
provision “is facially overbroad and not subject to either a narrowing 
construction or severance of unconstitutional provisions” and (2) the mail-
harassment statute “is facially overbroad, but that the statute can be saved 
through severance of the constitutionally problematic language.”
55
 For the 
stalking-by-mail provision, the court determined that the phrase “letters, 
telegrams, messages, packages . . . or any communication made through 
any available technologies or other objects” ignores the protections of the 
First Amendment and “covers every type of communication without 
limitation.”
56
 There is no intent requirement to separate this conduct from 
protected speech.
57
 For the mail-harassment statute, the court severed the 
phrases “disturb” and “causes distress” for their overbreadth but retained 
the phrase “abuse” for its narrower and more specific requirement.
58
 Thus, 
the court reversed A.J.B.’s charge under the unconstitutional stalking-by-
mail provision and remanded the case for reconsideration under the 
narrowed mail-harassment statute.
59
 This result allowed for a statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 845. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 844.  
 56. Id. at 849 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749(2)(6) (West 2018)).  
 57. See id.  
 58. Id. at 863 (explaining that “abuse” is universally understood to be criminal conduct, 
while “disturb” and “causes distress” can be reactions to non-criminal content, which is 
protected speech).  
 59. Id. at 864.  
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answer that has both a clear intent requirement and constitutional 
protections for the freedoms of state citizens. 
C. The Feds and Their Two Cents (Statutes) 
The federal government has also struggled to protect constitutional 
freedom while addressing cyberharassment. The two primary federal 
statutes used to address cyberharassment are 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (stalking) 
and 47 U.S.C. § 223 (harassing telecommunications). In the 1990s, stalking 
crimes “gr[ew] tremendously, plaguing law enforcement officials at all 
levels.”
60
 The federal stalking statute (§ 2261A) went into effect in 
September 1996.
61
 According to the House Judiciary Committee, the 
federal stalking statute “establish[ed] a new federal crime for crossing a 
State line, or otherwise entering a federal jurisdiction for the purpose of 
injuring or harassing another person,” specifically when this action “places 
the person in reasonable fear of bodily harm.”
62
 Congress amended this 
statute three times to arrive at the current version in 2018.
63
 Presently, the 
statute criminalizes use of “any interactive computer service or electronic 
communication service or electronic communication system of interstate 
commerce” with the intent to “kill, injure, harass, [or] intimidate,” to place 
a person in “reasonable fear of the death of or serious bodily injury” or 
cause “substantial emotional distress” to that person.
64
 
In United States v. Sayer, the First Circuit considered the 
constitutionality of the federal stalking statute amid truly terrifying facts.
65
 
Shawn Sayer and Jane Doe dated from 2004 to 2006, when Jane Doe ended 
their relationship.
66
 Although Jane Doe terminated the relationship, Sayer 
proceeded to stalk and harass Jane Doe “for over four years.”
67
 After Jane 
Doe filed a protective order against Sayer, he began to use the internet to 
invite anonymous, “dangerous-looking” men to Jane Doe’s house for 
“sexual entertainment.”
68
 On Craigslist, Sayer posted an ad in the “casual 
encounters section” which featured private photos of Jane Doe in lingerie, 
                                                                                                                 
 60. H.R. REP. NO. 104-557, at 2 (1996). 
 61. Id. at 1; 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2018).  
 62. H.R. REP. NO. 104-557, at 2. 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. 
 64. Id. § 2261A(2)(A)–(B). 
 65. United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 427 (1st Cir. 2014).  
 66. Id. at 428.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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directions to her home, and a detailed “list of sexual acts she was 
supposedly willing to perform.”
69
  
The “unwanted visits from men seeking sex” continued for eight more 
months until Jane Doe packed up her life, changed her name, and moved 
from Maine to Louisiana.
70
 Jane Doe started a new job and finally felt safe 
until two months later, “when an unknown man showed up at her home in 
Louisiana and addressed her by her new name.”
71
 Jane Doe ultimately 
decided to move back to Maine and did not stop receiving visits from these 
unwanted men until Sayer’s arrest in July 2010.
72
  
A grand jury indicted Sayer in 2011 with one count of cyberstalking and 
one count of identity theft.
73
 Sayer pled guilty to cyberstalking, conditional 
to a plea agreement that he be able to appeal.
74
 On appeal, Sayer argued that 
the stalking statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, vague, and, “because 
his course of conduct involved speech, or online communications, it cannot 
be proscribed in accord with the First Amendment.”
75
 The court rejected all 
these claims, pointing out that Sayer’s overbreadth argument takes the 
statute’s words “wholly out of context.”
76
 The court also noted that Sayer’s 
online communications are speech “integral to criminal conduct” which is 
recognized as part of a “long-established category of unprotected speech.”
77
 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the court affirmed the 
constitutionality of the statute. For the court, 
[t]he interstate stalking statute, which prohibits a course of 
conduct done with “intent to kill, injure, harass, or place under 
surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or 
cause substantial emotional distress” clearly targets conduct 
performed with serious criminal intent, not just speech that 
happens to cause annoyance or insult.
78
  
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 429. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 427.  
 75. Id. at 433–36.  
 76. Id. at 435–36. 
 77. Id. at 433–34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010)).  
 78. Id. at 435.  
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Thus, the court affirmed Sayer’s sentence and left the federal stalking 
statute intact.  
The second primary federal statute addressing cyberharassment regulates 
“obscene or harassing telephone calls.”
79
 This statute originated with the 
Communications Act of 1934, which “combined and organized federal 
regulation of telephone, telegraph, and radio communications.”
80
 The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 completely overhauled the 1934 Act by 
introducing language prohibiting certain types of “interstate or foreign 
communication by means of tele[phone].”
81
 Although earlier versions of the 
statute prohibited “indecent” transmissions, Congress subsequently 
removed this language on constitutional grounds.
82
 After several 
amendments, the current version prohibits the transmission of “any 
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication 
[via a telecommunications device] which is obscene or child pornography, 
with intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.”
83
  
In United States v. Popa, the District of Columbia Circuit found that 
elements of this harassing telecommunications statute (47 U.S.C. § 223) 
were unconstitutional as applied to a defendant engaging in political 
speech.
84
 Ion Cornel Popa, the defendant, came to the United States as a 
“political refugee from Romania” in 1986.
85
 In 1997, Popa made multiple 
anonymous phone calls to the office of then-U.S. Attorney for the District 
of Columbia Eric Holder.
86
 In recordings of the calls, Popa referred to 
Holder as a “whore, born by a negro whore” and as “a criminal, a negro.”
87
 
The jury found Popa guilty under 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C), which 
criminalizes “mak[ing] a telephone call or utiliz[ing] a telecommunications 
device, whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without 
                                                                                                                 
 79. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2018). 
 80. The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
(Nov. 27, 2013), https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1288#:~:text=The%20 
Communications%20Act%20of%201934%20combined%20and%20organized%20federal%
20regulation,oversee%20and%20regulate%20these%20industries. 
 81. Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 223.  
 82. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–21, 117 Stat. 650; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 
U.S. 844, 883 (1997).  
 83. 47 U.S.C. § 223.  
 84. 187 F.3d 672, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  
 85. Id. at 673.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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disclosing [one's] identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or 




On appeal, Popa challenged the constitutionality of the harassing 
telecommunications statute “based upon the expressive content of his 
speech, that is to say, that there was no conduct, separate from his 
communication, that would have caused his conviction.”
89
 The court 
accepted the government’s argument that intermediate scrutiny should be 
applied because the statute would “not survive even [a] less searching 
inquiry.”
90
 For the D.C. Circuit Court, “the statute could have been drawn 
more narrowly, without any loss of utility to the Government, by excluding 
from its scope those who intend to engage in public or political 
discourse.”
91
 The statute was constitutionally deficient because “no 
protection whatsoever is given to the political speech of one who intends 
both to communicate his political message and to annoy his auditor.”
92
 
Thus, the court held that the statute violated the First Amendment as 
applied, though the text remained through various challenges to other 
sections of the statute.
93
 
The survival of this harassing telecommunications statute, along with the 
stalking statute in Sayer, gives the federal government a strong toolkit to 
combat cyberharassment. The federal courts herein made clear that serious 
criminal intent is not a protected category of speech.
94
 However, Popa 
found that public and political discourse, being necessary to a free society, 
was a category of protected speech and should be carved out in harassment 
statutes.
95
 At the state level, West Virginia and Minnesota have successfully 
protected the citizenry and kept constitutionally tested cyberharassment 
laws in place.
96
 The West Virginia Supreme Court upheld harassment 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. at 674 (emphasis added).  
 89. Id. at 675 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 90. Id. at 676.  
 91. Id. at 677.  
 92. Id. at 678.  
 93. Id. at 679; see, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 883 (1997) (severing only “or 
indecent” from section 223(a)); 16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 243 (2020) (“If an as-applied 
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is successful, the statute may not be applied to 
the challenger but is otherwise enforceable.”).  
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 433–34 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 95. Popa, 187 F.3d at 677. 
 96. In re Welfare of A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 863 (Minn. 2019); State v. Calvert, No. 
15-0195, 2016 WL 3179968, at *5 (W. Va. June 3, 2016). 
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statutes because harassment is not protected speech.
97
 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court went a step further and emphasized that these harassment 
statutes need a specific intent requirement to avoid First Amendment 
encroachments.
98
 The caselaw on these federal and state statutes signals a 
warning siren, alerting Oklahoma’s legislators to the former errors in 
cyberharassment statute drafting. 
III. Analysis 
A. Oklahoma Logs On 
Like West Virginia, Oklahoma’s cyberharassment law originated from a 
standard telecommunications statute.
99
 In 2017, the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals described the law as “designed to criminalize the use of 
electronic communications to harass, intimidate, threaten, terrify, or make 
remarks which are ‘obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent.’”
100
 On 
May 30, 2019, Oklahoma added language that brings communications 
“including text, sound or images posted to a social media or other public 
media source”
101
 into the purview of its harassment statute.
102
 This new 




Oklahoma’s cyberharassment statute has five subsections (A, B, C, D, 
and E), with subsection (A) listing the six ways in which a person can 
unlawfully use telecommunication devices.
104
 Subsection (A)(1) makes it 
unlawful to make “any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal which is 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent.”
105
 Similar to the federal 
statute in Popa,
106
 subsection (A)(2) of Oklahoma’s new communication 
harassment law prohibits making communications “with intent to terrify, 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Calvert, 2016 WL 3179968, at *4. 
 98. See A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d at 860–61 (“Under certain circumstances, a specific-intent 
requirement may sufficiently limit the reach of a statute into protected speech and expressive 
conduct to avoid overbreadth.” (citing State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 978 (Minn. 
2017))). 
 99. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172 (Supp. 2020).  
 100. Rousch v. State, 2017 OK CR 7, ¶ 5, 394 P.3d 1281, 1283. 
 101. Act of May 13, 2019, ch. 357, 2019 Okla. Sess. Laws 1416, 1417.  
 102. Id. at 1416.  
 103. Id. at 1416–17. 
 104. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)–(E). 
 105. Id. § 1172(A)(1). 
 106. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2018). 
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intimidate or harass, or threaten to inflict injury or physical harm to any 
person or property of that person.”
107
 Subsection (A)(3) prohibits making “a 
telecommunication or other electronic communication, whether or not 
conversation ensues, with intent to put the party called in fear of physical 
harm or death.”
108
 Finally, although subsection (A)(6) addresses repeated 
calls or communications, this subsection only pertains to crimes in concert 
with others and does not include language such as “disturb” or “cause[s] 
distress” like Minnesota’s harassment law.
109
  
Notably, subsection (A)(1) is the only portion of the statute that does not 
assign some type of specific criminal intent.
110
 The remaining subsections 
of the statute target conduct of harassment, abuse, or inflicting the fear of 
death or serious injury.
111
 Persons convicted once of harassment under this 
statute are guilty of a misdemeanor, while persons convicted of their second 
offense are guilty of a felony.
112
 Lastly, Oklahoma’s harassment statute 
makes clear that the applicable communications may include “text, sound 
or images posted to a social media or other public media source.”
113
 
B. Specific Criminal Intent, but More Than Annoyance 
Oklahoma’s legislature can prohibit harassment committed with criminal 
intent.
114
 The First Amendment does not block legislators from prohibiting 
harassment simply because “the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or 
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed,” or 
even posted on the internet.
115
 A statute that prohibits harassment is not 
limiting speech because harassment is not protected by the First 
Amendment.
116
 As the Fourth Circuit explained, “[h]arassment is not 
                                                                                                                 
 107. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)(2). 
 108. Id. § 1172(A)(3). 
 109. Compare id. § 1172(A)(6), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.795(3) (West 2020). 
 110. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)(1). Subsection (A)(5) prohibits “[k]nowingly 
permit[ing] any telecommunication or other electronic communication under the control of 
the person to be used for any purpose prohibited by this section.” Id. § 1172(A)(5).  
 111. Id. § 1172(A)(2)–(6). 
 112. Id. § 1172(D)–(E). 
 113. Id. § 1172(B)(3). 
 114. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
 115. United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 433–34 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Giboney v. 
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)). 
 116. Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting State v. Thorne, 333 
S.E.2d 817, 819 (W. Va. 1985)). 
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communication, although it may take the form of speech.”
117
 Harassment, 
abuse, and threats intended to cause fear of physical harm or death are 
criminal conduct.
118
 This speech-integral-to-criminal-conduct category has 
long been exempted from general free speech protections.
119
 Therefore, 
when statutes prevent these types of harassment, “any expressive aspects of 
speech are not protected under the First Amendment when the speech, as an 
integral part of criminal conduct, serves solely to implement the . . . 
[criminal’s] purpose in intentionally harassing the victim.”
120
 
The subsections of Oklahoma’s cyberharassment statute that 
appropriately target criminal conduct (with criminal intent) do not abridge 
the First Amendment because they do not limit protected speech. As 
discussed above, the requirement of criminal intent is helpful, if not critical, 
to establish that the statute complies with the First Amendment.
121
 Four of 
the six subsections require some type of criminal intent.
122
 For example, 
subsection (A)(2) prohibits making an “electronic communication . . . with 
intent to terrify, intimidate or harass, or threaten to inflict injury or physical 
harm to any person or property of that person.”
123
 Other subsections 
prohibit conduct with the “intent to put the party in fear of physical harm or 
death” or “annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”
124
 Not only do these 
subsections match the language of similar statutes,
125
 but courts around the 
country have upheld similar statutory language.
126
 It must be noted that the 
necessary intent to abuse, annoy, or harass found in Popa was only 
questioned as applied to Popa’s engagement in political discourse.
127
  
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id.  
 118. See Buchanan v. Crisler, 922 N.W.2d 886, 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).  
 119. See, e.g., Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498 (“It has rarely been suggested that the 
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used 
as an integral part of conduct in violation of a criminal statute. We reject the contention 
now.”).  
 120. Buchanan, 922 N.W.2d at 898. 
 121. See In re Welfare of A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 854–55 (Minn. 2019); Dugan v. 
State, 451 P.3d 731, 737–38 (Wyo. 2019).  
 122. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)(2)–(A)(4), (A)(6) (Supp. 2020). 
 123. Id. § 1172(A)(2). 
 124. Id. § 1172(A)(3)–(A)(4). 
 125. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8 (2018); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-14a (West 2020). 
 126. See Dugan, 451 P.3d at 737–38. 
 127. United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The challenge here could 
have been avoided if the statute had language “excluding from its scope those who intend to 
engage in public or political discourse.” Id. Oklahoma should add this language to its 
cyberharassment statute to avoid similar as-applied challenges.  
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Several U.S. courts, however, have criticized the constitutionality of the 
specific intent to “annoy.”
128
 The word “annoy” appears only once in this 
statute, and as the Supreme Court has held: “[t]he state may not abridge 
one’s First Amendment freedoms merely to avoid annoyances.”
129
 The 
Court has also stated that “[s]peech is often provocative and 
challenging . . . . [But it] is nevertheless protected . . . unless shown likely 
to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises 
far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”
130
  
In Oklahoma’s primary harassment statute, courts have looked for more 
than just “annoyance”; there must be “objective facts that would support the 
court's determination that [the victim] actually feared death, bodily injury or 
experienced emotional distress.”
131
 Oklahoma legislators should seek to 
amend subsection (A)(4), which includes the word “annoy” in its intent 
clause, to avoid any facial criticism. While Oklahoma’s legislators are free 
to leave the statute intact and simply wait for a challenge, cutting out this 
language now can avoid unnecessary litigation down the road.  
C. Overbreadth Concerns  
Since specific criminal intent is pivotal to avoid limiting protected 
speech, subsection (A)(1) of Oklahoma’s cyberharassment statute risks 
unfavorable judicial scrutiny. This subsection makes it unlawful for a 
person to use a “telecommunication or other electronic communication 
device” to willfully “[m]ake[] any comment, request, suggestion, or 
proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent.”
132
 This 
language matches the 1994 text of the federal “[o]bscene or harassing 
telephone calls” statute verbatim.
133
 Congress added specific intent to that 
section in 1996.
134
 In 1997, the Supreme Court found that “indecent” was 
unconstitutionally overbroad and severed this word from the statute.
135
 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614–15 (1971); In re Welfare of A. J. B., 
929 N.W.2d 840, 862 (Minn. 2019). 
 129. Gov’t of V.I. v. Vanderpool, 767 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Coates, 402 
U.S. at 615). 
 130. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). 
 131. Holeman v. White, 2012 OK CIV APP 107, ¶¶ 14–15, 292 P.3d 65, 68. 
 132. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)(1) (Supp. 2020). 
 133. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 223(1)(A) (1994), with 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)(1). 
 134. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1996). 
 135. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 883 (1997).  
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The Supreme Court has “categorically settled . . . that obscene material is 
unprotected by the First Amendment.”
137
 However, the Court has 
admonished that “where obscenity is not involved, we have consistently 
held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not 
justify its suppression.”
138
 As the Supreme Court stated, language that is 
merely “indecent” can be protected speech.
139
 For the Court recognized that 
indecent speech may have “significant social or artistic value.”
140
  
Oklahoma’s statute correctly attempts to limit obscene communication; 
however, the statute sweeps far beyond obscene speech. Subsection (A)(1) 
has no intent requirement and targets an almost unlimited category of 
communication. As one state supreme court noted, “Properly crafted 
harassment or stalking statutes do not punish the simple act of 
communicating statements.”
141
 Therefore, it seems unlikely that subsection 
(A)(1), which includes “any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal” 
that might be considered “indecent,” would survive a constitutional 
challenge.
142
 This wide reach ignores any permissible purpose for 
communication found to be merely indecent or offensive.
143
 Moreover, if 
Oklahoma adds an intent requirement, the legislature should also consider 
severing the same language which Congress eliminated (“lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, or indecent”) and replacing it with “child pornography.”
144
 This 
structure allows the statute to retain prohibitions on two types of speech 
which are constitutionally permissible: obscenity and child pornography.
145
 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 603, 117 Stat. 650, 687.  
 137. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
 138. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977). 
 139. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877–78.  
 140. Id. at 882 n.47. 
 141. Dugan v. State, 451 P.3d 731, 737 (Wyo. 2019). 
 142. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)(1) (Supp. 2020). 
 143. “Similarly, a parent who sent his 17–year–old college freshman information on birth 
control via e-mail could be incarcerated even though neither he, his child, nor anyone in 
their home community found the material ‘indecent’ or ‘patently offensive,’ if the college 
town’s community thought otherwise.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 878.  
 144. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 603, 117 Stat. 650, 687. 
 145. In re Welfare of A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Minn. 2019) (quoting United States 
v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012)). 
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Obscene matter and child pornography are never protected; however, 




D. Simple Solutions for Simple Errors 
This Note has identified three key constitutional solutions for 
Oklahoma’s cyberharassment statute: First, legislators should assign a 
specific criminal intent for every subsection. Second, legislators should 
eliminate any use of the intent to “annoy.” Lastly, legislators should remove 
the phrase “or indecent” and its accompanying descriptors and replace this 
language with “child pornography.” The court in State v. Calvert properly 
upheld the West Virginia Statute
147
 which complies with each of the 
requirements this Note has identified. This statute gives intent to each 




Further, West Virginia’s statute complies with the drafting requirements 
set out in another state’s supreme court.
149
 For that court, a proper 
harassment statute must include that “the defendant act with specific 
criminal intent . . . and political speech is expressly excluded from the 
statute’s reach.”
150
 While not as pressing as the three issues mentioned 
above, Oklahoma can also consider making an exception for political 
speech—just as the D.C. Circuit suggested in Popa.
151
 The amendments 
proposed herein provide a roadmap for Oklahoma legislators to continue 
shielding the citizenry from cyberharassment while also avoiding 
unconstitutional limits on free speech. 
IV. Conclusion 
After a comparative analysis, there are subsections of Oklahoma’s 
cyberharassment law that are more constitutionally sound than others. 
While Oklahoma’s lawmakers are free to await the storm, the solutions are 
too simple to jeopardize the protection of cyberharassment victims. 
Subsection (A)(1) of Oklahoma’s statute is unconstitutionally overbroad 
because it lacks a specific intent requirement and restricts both protected 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 883.  
 147. State v. Calvert, No. 15-0195, 2016 WL 3179968, at *5 (W. Va. June 3, 2016). 
 148. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-14a(a) (West 2020).  
 149. Dugan v. State, 451 P.3d 731, 737 (Wyo. 2019).  
 150. Id.  
 151. United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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and unprotected speech. This overbreadth leaves room for the state to 
suppress offensive-but-protected speech. The remaining subsections of this 
statute comply with the First Amendment and target purely criminal 
conduct.
152
 However, the legislature ought to consider severing the word 
“annoy” and carving out specific protections for political speech.  
This Note opened with the story of Maddie, a young transgender girl 
from rural Oklahoma.
153
 The malicious language her community used 
online intended to do her harm—they wanted her to feel the fear of physical 
harm or death. This intentionally harassing language is probably not 
unfamiliar to girls like Maddie, but it is certainly criminal. The survival of 
Oklahoma’s cyberharassment statute is imperative to the safety of all 
individuals subject to online abuse. The statute’s language is a legal quilt of 
the many cyberharassment and telecommunication laws across the country. 
A unique collection of statutory language brings the inherent history behind 
each phrase (some of which have already been verified or deemed 
unconstitutional). The legislature should work quickly to remedy structural 
errors to allow Oklahoma to keep proper statutory protections for 
cyberharassment. Whether it be a young transgender girl from rural 
Oklahoma or a single woman seeking a new beginning, there are endless 




                                                                                                                 
 152. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
 153. Supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
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